Two faces of Hungary

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Two Faces of Hungary: From Democratization to Democratic Backsliding

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Since 1989, Hungary has experienced great political, social, and economic changes. In political terms, in the span of three decades, Hungary accomplished a successful and peaceful transition to democracy, consolidated its democracy, became a member of the principal Western liberal institutions such as NATO and the European Union, and, after experiencing a crisis of public confidence in its democratic institutions and its political elite, it witnessed the deconsolidation and the erosion of its democracy. Economically and socially, successive governments have grappled with trying to square the circle of high foreign debt, low growth, high unemployment, sinking living standards, increasing inequality, and the financial untenability of Hungary's social welfare system.

Below we point out the most important political, social, and economic developments of the past 30 years. We show that there were some systemically encoded factors, such as the non-participatory nature of the democratic regime created in 1989 and unexpected external developments (e.g., the 2008 financial crisis) that made the process of governing more complex.[1] However, the deconsolidation of Hungarian democracy and the birth of a heavily centralized hybrid regime whose governing practices have been described as typical of a mafia state,[2] were not inevitable. Rather, it was the choices of the political actors who have wielded power since 1989 that are primarily responsible for the systematic dismantling of democracy and the development of a peculiar hybrid regime that combines features of both liberal democracy and dictatorship.

We divide our argument into four subsections. In the first section, we discuss the characteristics of the process of democratic transition. In the second section, we illuminate the process of democratic consolidation, including the role that external forces, especially the European Union, played in it, and summarize the success and failure of the first 20 years of post-Communist politics in Hungary with an emphasis on the latter and the consequent deconsolidation of the regime. The third section is devoted to a discussion of the current populist regime, sometimes in a comparative perspective with developments prior to 2010. Although the Orbán regime is a moving target whose final shape is still unclear, we describe both its development and its main characteristics as of 2018. In the final concluding section, we ponder the possibilities of re-democratization in Hungary.

FROM COMMUNISM TO DEMOCRACY

In 1989, Hungarian democracy was born as a result of a peaceful but revolutionary process of change that ended four decades of Communist rule and established the contours of the new democratic regime. External as well as internal factors paved the way for these changes in the 1980s. Externally, the rise of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies allowed more freedom of manoeuvre for the rising reformist faction within the Hungarian Communist party and the emergence of opposition organizations.[3] Furthermore, the success of Solidarity's "self-limiting revolution"[4] in Poland made it clear that the ailing Soviet Union would not rush to the defense of its Communist allies in Central Europe as it had done in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Internally, "goulash" communism, which had promised economic well-being and more cultural tolerance for Hungarians in exchange for people setting aside their

grievances over the tragedy of the 1956 revolution,[5] became increasingly untenable financially. The financing of comparatively acceptable living standards in the 1960s and early 1970s through foreign loans led to high foreign debt, and the regime was no longer able to uphold its end of the compromise: production and living standards steadily declined from 1976 onward. This provoked increasing public criticism and, occasionally, resistance. The aging Communist leadership could not cope with these challenges for long, and dissent appeared both inside and outside the Party.

By 1989, civil society was blossoming: critical intellectuals were active in discussion forums and organized new political associations and parties. At the same time, reform-oriented lawyers and economists questioned the very foundations of the regime. Non-violent protests helped to demonstrate the power of the opposition forces, and this, along with a desire on all sides to avoid repeating the bloodshed and tragedy of the 1956 revolution, led to negotiations between the ruling of Communist party, the satellite organizations of the Communist Party, and the Opposition Roundtable formed by competing opposition forces to maximize their influence.[6]

The most highly esteemed political value and the most important political goal of the regime-changing elite was the achievement of freedom, which was understood both in its liberal and in its democratic sense. On the one hand, the desired end state was the establishment of liberal freedom. In the political community they had envisioned, people could talk freely and openly both in private and in public, the press was free, and the freedoms of assembly and party formation were guaranteed as the inalienable right of every citizen. At the time, freedom was understood in a *negative* rather than a positive sense,[7] as independence *from* the state (the party, the police, the military, and the government as a whole). The goal was individual

freedom, that is, the opportunity for individuals to pursue their activities free of harassment, interference, and control.

On the other hand, freedom as a democratic value was identified with *popular sovereignty*, that is, with the idea of a political community that was created by the will and consent of the people. This reflected not only the desire to end forty years of Soviet control, but also five hundred years of experience and discontent with foreign domination. Most notably, Hungary had been under the formal control of the Ottoman Empire (1541-1686) and the Habsburg Empire (1686-1918), although Hungary was granted considerable autonomy in 1867 through the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*)and was able to expand its autonomy every ten years, when the original agreement came up for renegotiation. Hungary achieved *de jure* independence at the end of World War I, but paid a considerable price for it. As a defeated power, it lost two-thirds of its historical territory leaving a large number of Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary. Subsequently, Hungary aligned itself with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in order to remedy this shock of territorial loss, which subsequently resulted in German influence over Hungarian domestic matters.[8] After the end of World War II, Hungary quickly came under Soviet control and a communist one-party system was established, which would last for more than four decades.

Since Hungary had had little experience with democracy prior to 1989, roundtable participants had to draw on other historical (and philosophical) experience to create a new democratic regime. The result was an understanding of democracy as *representative* government wherein people exercised their constitutional powers indirectly through their elected representatives. While the establishment of civil liberties and political competition was vital to the new elite, democratic participation

was of lesser priority, simply because of the negative connotation the word 'participation' had acquired during the Communist era, when participation was forced on the people. Be that as it may, the regime changing elite's preferences for civil liberties and competition to the detriment of participatory democracy impacted the nature of the democratic political system it had created: besides elections, it would come to allow few opportunities for citizen participation, and would remain an elite enterprise.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1990-2010)

The establishment and consolidation of democracy

The first democratic elections in 1990 signalled both the end of regime transition and the beginning of democratic consolidation. With the heavy amending of its constitution and the declaration of a democratic republic replacing the "people's republic", the institutional requirements of parliamentary democracy had been created in 1989. The parliament became the center of democratic politics. Its members were elected in a complex electoral system that reflected a difficult compromise between the Communist party and the Opposition Roundtable and that combined single member districts with national and party lists (see table 10.1). The unicameral parliament elected the prime minister, and ministers, as members of the cabinet, were responsible to the prime minister directly, not to the parliament. As this arrangement demonstrates, the prime minister was the strongest political actor, whose importance was likened to that of the chancellor in Germany.[9] Meanwhile, the presidency of the republic was largely a ceremonial office with the president elected by the parliament. The parliament also elected the members of the Constitutional

Court (for 9 years), and the ombudsmen (for 6 years). Their independence, just as that of the National Bank, was guaranteed constitutionally.[10]

TABLE 10.1 ABOUT HERE

The political elite's desire in the early 1990s to see Hungary return to Europe gave Western political institutions a leverage of influence in the 1990s. While the Council of Europe, which Hungary joined in 1991, and NATO, of which Hungary became a member in 1999, were important actors on their own right, the European Union emerged as the most influential external player. This was not unrelated to the fact that the idea of joining the EU was also popular with the public that, in the midst of the economic hardships that regime change had brought on them, identified the European Union with much coveted social welfare. The EU fostered the improvement of democratic practices and the stabilization and maturing of democracy in Hungary through the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, which defined the conditions of EU membership. These conditions included goals such as a functioning democracy, respect for the rule of law, and human rights, and the effective protection of minorities. The annual reports of the European Commission on the achievements of Central and Southeast European candidate countries in these respects and others, were also helpful tools in supporting and reinforcing democratic reforms. By the time of Hungary's accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, it was considered to be a consolidated democracy.[11]

The political system between 1990 and 2010 was a liberal democracy characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, representative government, strong opposition, free media, strong and respected institutions that protected the

rule of law and independent courts. Barring a few striking exceptions, humans rights were generally respected, and religious freedoms were not restricted. Initially, the system also offered a great deal of political choice to people, as parties mushroomed after 1990. On the political left, the major players proved to be the center-left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which was the successor of the former Communist party, and the newly formed left-liberal parties: the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz). Viable options on the political right included two historical parties (i.e., parties that had existed before the Communist takeover in 1948)— the agrarian Independent Smallholder's Party (FKGP), the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)—and the newly formed the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) (see table 10.2).

TABLE 10.2 ABOUT HERE

Subsequent electoral competition seemed to suggest a healthy and consolidated democracy in which the electorate judged the performance of each successive government as substandard and, accordingly, voted them out of office until 2006 when the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government managed to retain its power. In 1994, voters replaced the center-right MDF-FKGP-KDNP government with the center-left MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, only to vote them out of office in favor of a center-right coalition led by Fidesz, a party that had moved from the left to the right in the previous four years. In 2002, it was again the turn of a center-left MSZP-SZDSZ coalition to govern. That coalition won a second mandate in 2006, but was voted out of office in 2010. The 2010 elections were a crushing defeat for the Socialists, relegating MSZP to the status of a small parliamentary party, and resulted in the

collapse of SZDSZ as a political force. Most voters refrained from extremist alternatives at this stage, allowing only one extreme right and revisionist party, the Party of Hungarian Life and Justice (MIÉP), a small and temporary surge in 1998. Jobbik, a radical right party, composed of younger, more militant supporters who endorsed law and order and championed nationalism with racist overtones, only gained electoral significance and staying power after 2010 by which time democracy was already in serious trouble as a consequence of general disillusionment not only with the governing Socialists but also with the political system and the political elite in general.

The deconsolidation of democracy

Loss of confidence in and the deconsolidation of democracy unfolded gradually as a result of three parallel and interrelated processes. First, Hungarian democracy evolved into a partocracy,[12] that is, a system in which democracy was exercised almost exclusively by and through parties. Matters could only be settled through the parties and their clientele as parties took over all aspects of politics: they placed their members even in supposedly independent committees, sought expert advice only from their own experts, and had their own journalists write media reports. The result was a system in which the welfare of the public became secondary to the interests of the parties and their leaders, and in which the effectiveness and independence of civil society were compromised as it had to attract funding by catering to the interests of the parties.

Second, the parties reacted to the competition for the increasing spoils of government by maximizing their votes through the destruction or assimilation of their smaller rivals. Meanwhile, the political system—especially the five per cent electoral

threshold and party financing laws—made it difficult for new parties, which may have been able to represent voters' interests better, to enter parliamentary politics. In the end, only two main rivals—MSZP and Fidesz—remained. This left voters with increasingly few and rather unappealing options, leading them to cast their votes for what they believed was the least bad alternative. At the same time, partocracy and strong competition between the parties resulted in the polarization of the party system and stronger voter identification with parties.[13] Partocracy quickly spread polarization between the political left and right to society in general, creating what many Hungarians called a "cold civil war". Finally, behind the sharp rhetoric that characterized the political parties, a system of co-dependence developed within and among the parties. Everyone knew everything about each other, leaving members of the political elite vulnerable to blackmail. Party leaderships maintained their unity by threatening the recalcitrant and rewarding the loyal with the spoils that partocracy offered. The loyalty norm discouraged disagreement and political dialogue, further limiting the political actors' ability and desire to innovate and find solutions to the acute social and economic problems that had plagued Hungary constantly after 1989.

Parallel to political transition, Hungary was also transforming its economy from a centrally planned one characterized by full employment to a capitalist one driven by profit. This process affected society as a whole through high inflation, dwindling wages, and soaring unemployment, and hit low-skilled workers, the elderly, the Roma, and those living outsides major cities the hardest. Yet, support for the new regime remained high: in the hope for a better future, people were willing to defer consumption for a few years. The political elite also sought to compensate the early losers of transition by early retirement, generous pensions, and social assistance

benefits financed from income that the privatization of state assets to foreign investors generated. Low corporate taxes and low wages served to attract foreign investment but skewed the burden of taxes on the citizens in the form of high income tax and high tax rates on consumption. However, such a system of taxation could not offset the loss of privatization as an income source after the mid-1990s, resulting in increasing public debts.[14]

Regardless of their political leanings, governments reacted to the public debt crisis in a uniform fashion. They introduced reforms in a coup-like manner without any social dialogue. Reforms always meant additional austerity measures that demanded further sacrifices from citizens. It seemed that the political elite thought that the patience of society was endless, and that citizens did not need to be co-opted into decisions that had a major—negative—impact on their livelihoods. Even the Socialists, who normally would have been on the side of society, fell victim to this trend, emphasizing to the citizens that "There Is No Alternative" to reforms and austerity.[15] The Socialist governments in the 2000s sought to offset low wages by liberal credit policies. However, credit-based consumption increased household debts ten-fold in 1999-2006, leaving Hungarians with no or little savings and high debts, thus, generally unable to face unexpected expenses. The external shock of the 2008 financial crisis drove this home emphatically: many families were falling into poverty either because they tried to continue to repay their debts by squeezing the family budget in other respects or because they defaulted on their credit payments and were losing their homes.[16] The new caretaker government of Gordon Bajnai reacted to the crisis in the same way as previous ones: it tackled the public debt crisis through a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and introduced austerity measures, which were a condition on the IMF loan, but that only increased

the plight of the citizenry further. This was particularly damaging as it came two years after the leaking of Prime Minister Gyurcsány's speech of May 2006 to his inner circle in which he openly admitted that the government had mismanaged the economy after 2002 and lied about it to the public.[17] It appeared that the governing Socialists had had a complete disregard for the public, and were more interested in using the spoils of politics to enrich themselves and in catering to foreign interests than in advocating for the well-being of the country's citizens.

In the end, all these political and economic developments cast a negative light on the transition process, made the benefits of democracy unclear, and discredited the political elite in general. As a heritage of Communism, citizens were distrustful of political institutions from the beginning. However, two decades of democracy, or rather, partocracy, did nothing to increase public trust. It only further exacerbated citizens' distrust. People were sick of a partocracy that offered them nothing or almost nothing, but because of the weakness of civil society, the limited and shrinking opportunities for participation, and the political culture of passive individualism, which characterized the post-1956 decades and survived into democracy, they were unable to organize themselves to have their voice heard. As a consequence, people came to the conclusion that anything was better than the current regime, especially better than the left-liberal parties in government, which suffered the brunt of public wrath. By 2010, hundreds of thousands of impoverished people became receptive to the message of the extreme right that "Hungary belongs to the Hungarians." For the majority, Fidesz's promise of a strong state and strong leadership embalmed in a populist, Christian, and ethno-nationalist rhetoric became attractive, and the electorate rewarded Fidesz with a two-thirds parliamentary majority that allowed that party to do as it pleased.

THE ORBÁN REGIME (2010-)

The erosion of democracy

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán interpreted his two-thirds victory in 2010 as a "revolutionary" mandate that created exceptional circumstances in which extraordinary means were acceptable. Accordingly, he deployed warlike, offensive tactics, pushing legislation through parliament by which he quickly and systematically rebuilt the political and legal systems to his party's advantage. As part of this process, Fidesz carried out a constitutional coup d'état whereby the 1989 inclusive, consensual, and democratic constitution was replaced with the Fundamental Law of 2011 that concentrated power in the hands of the government:

> *It [Fidesz] won two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament in a system where a single two-thirds vote is enough to change the constitution. Twelve times in a year in office, it amended the constitution it inherited. Those amendments removed most of the institutional checks that could have stopped what the government did next – which was to install a new constitution. The new Fidesz constitution was drafted in secret, presented to the Parliament with only one month for debate, passed by the votes of only the Fidesz parliamentary bloc, and signed by a President that Fidesz had named. Neither the opposition parties nor civil society organizations nor the general public had any influence in the constitutional process. There was no popular ratification.*[18]

The resulting Fundamental Law was the codification of the electoral manifesto of Fidesz. It established the System of National Cooperation (NER) that Orbán had advocated during the 2010 elections as a new social contract.[19] Starting with a vow, which listed Hungarian's pride and hope and pledged to join hands and build a better future, the new constitutional document increased the role of religion, traditions and national values, in effect establishing a "national religious belief system." This new politicized Christianity was unusual in Central Europe, and also a novel development

in comparison with the rest of Europe. The new document subtly limited the breadth of democracy. For example, it deemphasized the importance of individual freedoms by lumping them together with communal interests. Though the Fundamental Law (in one sentence only) formally maintained the form of a republic, it broke with the essential notion of a republic, by changing the name of the country from "Republic of Hungary" to simply "Hungary." As it stressed the importance of a unified nation, it disregarded certain social minorities and their protection: equality before the law was defined in terms of gender, ethnicity, and religion, but did not include legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.[20]

Orbán moved less subtly as he employed a combination of legal measures and informal political practices to limit political competition.[21] After coming to power, the Fidesz government filled the National Electoral Commission, which was responsible for conducting clean and smooth elections, with its own people. Legal changes introduced shortly before the municipal elections of 2010 made it more difficult for smaller parties to gain seats in local governments. Regarding parliamentary elections, a completely new law was passed, which left the mixed system from 1989 largely in place, but further decreased its proportionality in order to make the life of smaller parties difficult. The number of single-member districts increased in proportion to the seats that can be gained through party lists. The total number of parliamentary representatives was cut radically (from 386 to 199). This process allowed Fidesz to gerrymander electoral districts to suit its partisan interests: the boundaries of electoral districts were drawn so as to make the left-wing districts more populous than the right-wing ones. Under the new law, not only the parties that fail to win a seat in a district are compensated through party lists for votes they have received, but the party of the winning candidate is also compensated for any votes

that it gains in excess of the number of votes that were necessary to win the seat in a given electoral district (see table 10.1). To increase the chances of Fidesz to win re-election, the electoral campaign period was reduced, and campaign advertisements in the commercial media were banned. The new candidate nomination process, which directs parties to collect hand-filled nomination tickets instead of printed tickets that each voter had received from the electoral commission when elections were called, became a hotbed for electoral fraud that disproportionally affects districts where Fidesz is in trouble.[22] Furthermore, the composition of the electorate was changed by granting voting rights to Hungarians in neighbouring countries who vote overwhelmingly for Fidesz and by making it difficult for Hungarians living in other countries—most likely anti-Fidesz voters—to cast a vote.[23] The result is an electoral system that is neither fair nor free.[24] It is heavily biased in favor of the only large party in the system, Fidesz, which won re-election with 2/3 majorities both in 2014 and in 2018 after receiving less than 50 per cent of the votes.[25] This is the most disproportionate mixed electoral system in Europe.

As for the 2018 parliamentary elections, the OSCE-ODIHR statement claimed that the elections were characterized by a pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources, undermining contestants' ability to compete on an equal basis. Voters had a wide range of political options but intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric, media bias and opaque campaign financing constricted the space for genuine political debate, hindering voters' ability to make fully-informed choices…. Contrary to OSCE commitments, citizen election observation is not permitted."[26] Another independent analysis arrived at similar conclusions stating that the Fidesz leadership led a fundamentally racist campaign against migrants and foreigners, with "disproportionate resources and the explicit backing of state institutions, which

focused on fear-mongering, employed conspiracy theories and fake news, and issued some open threats. The ruling party neither engaged in open public debate on its governing record, nor presented concrete policy plans."[27]

The lines between party and politics became blurred in other respects as well. After 2010, the government put its own loyal supporters at the head of institutions that are supposed to have oversight of the legislative and executive branches of government (e.g., the Ombudsmen and the State Audit Agency). The independence of the justice system was curtailed by curbing the rights of lawyers in criminal proceedings and by forcing judges into early retirement. Public institutions were renamed government institutions, and the Orbán government introduced laws that made the immediate dismissal of public employees without cause possible, opening the way for the cleansing of the entire government apparatus. Soon, public administration became politicized and riddled with conflicts of interest.

The fate of the Constitutional Court is a good example of how Orbán punishes any individual or institution that resists his power grab. In the autumn of 2010 the Constitutional Court repealed a government statute because of its unconstitutional retroactive effects. Subsequently, Fidesz retaliated by amending the Constitution, limiting the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. Fidesz further ensured that the Court complied with its policies, and the Court became a puppet of the government when the parliament changed the selection of the head of the Constitutional Court and the number of its members. Now it is the parliament that appoints the head of the Constitutional Court while beforehand members selected the president of the court from among their own ranks. The number of judges was raised from eleven to fifteen so that Fidesz could pack the court with right-wing personalities and former politicians close to Fidesz.

Opposition opinions have been forced out of much of the Hungarian media. Although the neutrality of public-service media channels had always been a problem, they have broadcast exclusively government propaganda since 2010. State-sponsored television news reports resemble criminal shows in which the denunciations and character assassination of political opponents have replaced political debate. The media laws of 2010, which the European Parliament condemned in 2011 for violating the freedom of the press,[28] gave extensive rights to a supervisory authority the membership of which consists exclusively of Fidesz loyalists. This body has the right to issue disproportionately high financial penalties at its discretion to print and electronic media outlets and even to bloggers for the violation of media laws. These measures have effectively curtailed press freedom through intimidation and fear, resulting in self-censorship on the part of journalists and television reporters. Today free speech is restricted to blogs. At the same time, the government—often through its new and pro-Fidesz national capitalist class—bought up media outlets, which it either transformed to its own image (e.g., *TV2, origo.hu, Figyelő*), or suspended its operations (e.g., the biggest opposition newspaper, *Népszabadság*). In other cases (e.g., *Klubrádió*), the government used or tried to use the power of the law, more specifically its control over the tenders that allocate media frequencies, to eliminate opposition media outlets.[29] The diversity of the media has further shriveled in the wake of the 2018 elections. Two conservative media outlets—the daily *Magyar Nemzet* and *Lánchíd Rádió*—owned by Orbán's former friend and current nemesis, Lajos Simicska, were closed the week after the 2018 national elections due to financial difficulties. The English language online newspaper, *Budapest Beacon*, ceased operating the same week citing the

impossibility of publishing a fact-based newspaper as a result of the erosion of media plurality.[30]

The characteristics of the Orbán regime

These changes resulted in a sharp decline in the democratic credentials of the Hungarian political system. Hungary's Freedom in the World score dropped from 91 (out of 100) to just 72 between 2006 and 2018 (see figure 10.1). Other measures, such as the Democracy Index of the UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit or the Democracy Barometer, evidence the same trend.[31] The new regime that Orbán likes to call an "illiberal democracy" but his critics see as a "postmodern autocracy",[32] is in effect a hybrid regime that combines democratic and autocratic features.[33] According to the Hungarian philosopher, Ágnes Heller, "illiberal democracy is a postmodern form of despotism" since dictators do not need to come to power by violent means anymore but by the will of the majority.[34] Democratic institutions remain in place formally, but they no longer offer effective control over governmental power. Most of the media are controlled by the government, and journalists and private citizens are equally hesitant to speak up in fear of losing their jobs. Political competition is possible, but the broader institutional structure is biased against the opposition. The opposition is fragmented, consisting of numerous small and competing parties (see table 10.3) and is unable to unite, which would be their only chance of beating Fidesz. Social protests periodically flare up as was the case when the government wanted to tax internet services or when it started to target Central European University, the last stronghold of liberalism in Hungary, but so far such protests failed to generate a political force.[35]

FIGURE 10.1 ABOUT HERE

TABLE 10.3 ABOUT HERE

The regime operates on the basis of a mixture of an extreme centralization of power, the institutionalization of corruption, populist measures, and nationalistic rhetoric. Political power is concentrated in the hands of one person, Vikor Orbán, who tends to make all major political decisions himself, and controls resources informally through his "adopted political family" made up of party-members and personal and business friends who are bound together by a strong loyalty norm.[36] They are the winners of lucrative government tenders, the holders of powerful political offices, and the major beneficiaries of the governments' social and economic policies, including a flat tax rate. The ruling party has legislated corruption into state policy. Thus, corruption no longer comes from outside the state; on the contrary, it has become the leading principle of the state.[37]

The political process is used to advance the personal goals of the Prime Minister, which are political and material, and not ideological, for Orbán believes that the era of ideology is over. Most importantly, Orbán has been interested and has encouraged the establishment of a new political, economic, and social elite. Corruption as well as the restructuring of industries (e.g., the tobacco industry, agriculture or tourism), which is often achieved through nationalization and subsequent reprivatization, are means by which a new national capitalist class has been built.[38] Usually, the future members of this class first participate in the creation of the relevant legislation, then reap the harvest of legal provisions that were tailored to their interests. In effect, the state has been captured by a closed group of like-minded political and economic entrepreneurs,[39] a new elite with homogenized

attitudes. This group uses the state to extract resources for its own particular goals under the aegis of the common good and through the practice of power conversion whereby political power strengthens their economic power and vice versa. This way the capitalist economy is replaced with a relational economy in which one's political power defines one's economic opportunities.[40]

The Orbán regime is indeed a "postmodern autocracy" in that its policies are selective in targeting various social strata in diverse and contradictory ways. The regime favors the rich (e.g., through the neo-liberal policy of flat tax rates) in order to win their support for the regime. As for the middle and lower middle classes, who fear that they might slide down the social ladder, they are kept in the state of constant anxiety and mobilization through ethno-nationalist propaganda. With regard to the Roma and the destitute, the discriminatory and authoritarian views prevalent in the interwar era are bolstered,[41] while in treating the retirees, the socialist pragmatic policy of "peaceful coexistence" is applied. Social exclusion happens not only hierarchically but also horizontally. The government has been determined to break up civil society and horizontal networks of solidarity into smaller groups that do not communicate with one another. Thus, the idea of social exclusion is linked to the practice of *divide et impera.* The regime is based on mentalities, prejudices, and fear rather than any coherent ideology.

The government used educational reforms to socialize the citizenry into the system of national cooperation and to reduce social mobility so as to bring the process of change to a close by entrenching the new social hierarchy. Local government and foundation schools were nationalized, and a significant number of these schools were placed in the hands of churches. The curriculum was homogenized in public schools and graduation age was reduced from 18 to 16 years.

The law on public education saw discipline rather than learning as the primary goal of public education, and extended the right of the state so that it could intervene in the lives of children and parents. The new higher education law also limits the number of students that can be accepted into universities with financial aid from the state. To prevent citizens seeking social mobility abroad, it also mandates students to retroactively repay their tuition fees if they choose to live abroad after completing their studies.

The government maintains its middle-class support base by a variety of populist measures, while it ignores the plight of the Roma, the unemployed, and the poor who are unlikely to vote for Fidesz or vote at all. Populist policies aim at dividing the population and distracting people's attention from other government decisions that are detrimental to them, such as the changes in the labor code (which severely limited workers' and unions' rights) and the scandalous state of the health care system, or from the government's corrupt practices. The government uses programs that offer immediate and tangible financial benefits for citizens (e.g., reduction in the prices of electricity, gas and other utility costs by law and programs that have allowed a select group of citizens to replace their home appliances or have holidays at reduced prices). The government is determined to restrict the operations of civic organizations by making their financial future uncertain. Similarly, the Orbán government launched a systematic campaign against its "enemies", including outstanding artists, scholars, and intellectuals who criticized or disagreed with them and certain former politicians, members of the government or office-holders, as well as left-wing and liberal intellectuals, with the aim of criminalizing them.

The government communicates populist measures with ruthless efficiency. For example, service providers have been required to state on the bills they issue the

amount of money the consumer "saved" thanks to the government.[42] Third, the government organizes "national consultations" with citizens from time to time whereby the Prime Minister writes to each citizen asking for their opinions in mail-order questionnaires. These questionnaires are heavily biased and make it impossible to express objections to government policies. Indeed, the real purpose of this consultative process is not to listen to what the citizens think, but rather to keep Fidesz supporters engaged by informing them about the policy positions they should propagate. "Results" are used as propaganda tools to legitimize the government's policies.

Political messages also serve to unify the conservative support base of Fidesz. This group is known for its symbolic rhetoric of national unification and traditionalist ideals. As part of its nationalistic discourse, Orbán proclaimed the day of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty (which followed World War I) as a day of national unity, thereby exploiting the nostalgia for Admiral Miklós Horthy's nationalist and revanchist interwar policies. At the same time, the Orbán government attempted to rewrite history to suggest that all Hungarians had been victims of German Nazism.[43] Prime Minister Orbán regularly criticizes the legacy of Communism, liberalism, and the forces of globalization, which he sees as the most important political threat for Hungary presently, and offers the idea of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation as protection against these forces. The rhetoric of national unification was used to legitimize the granting of Hungarian citizenship, including the right to vote, to any Hungarians living in neighboring countries who wished to request it. Economic nationalism and national sovereignty have underpinned Orbán's attacks on banks (most Hungarian banks are in foreign hands), the multinational corporations, foreign media, and the officials of the European Union. However, despite the verbal attacks

on the multinationals, the regime taxes them lightly, which reveals the characteristic hypocrisy of the government. Domestically, national unification found its expression in a historically justified and selective ethno-national conception of the nation[44] and in the unorthodox policies of the "System of National Cooperation" that seeks to guard against the ills of liberal democracy through a combination of statism, economic nationalism, crony protectionism, and neo-liberalism. Meanwhile, the government's traditionalist-conservative rhetoric built around the ideas of work, home, order, family, and security[45] exploits the emotional impact these slogans have on the more traditional part of Hungarian society that cherish these ideals.

Besides the more positive message of national unity and traditional values, the government also uses fear and the creation of enemies to keep its grip on its followers. In particular, liberal philanthropist George Soros has been targeted as the mastermind behind a conspiracy that wants to systematically undermine the achievements of the government by, for example, dumping migrants on Hungarians. Indeed, the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe presented the government with an easy target and a golden opportunity. The government pictured migrants from war-torn areas (e.g., Syria) as Muslim-extremists and as faceless and inhuman creatures that move around in hoards as puppets of evil liberal forces, and vowed to protect the country and Christianity from them.

In reality, it is emigration—and not immigration—that has emerged as a national trend. Hungarians, who did not initially live with the opportunity that the freedom of movement in the EU offered them, reacted to the absence of political diversity and economic opportunities by moving abroad: an estimated 500,000 people—out of about 10 million—have left the country in the last few years to seek a better life primarily in Germany, France, the UK, and Austria. Today more

Hungarians live in London than in Debrecen, the second largest city in the country.[46] At the beginning, it was mostly the highly-educated who spoke foreign languages who left, but they were soon followed by blue collar workers, creating a labor shortage in Hungary. This mass emigration is particularly noteworthy because it has no major tradition in Hungary.[47] The trend is projected to continue until 2030 with 30-35,000 people leaving annually,[48] robbing the country of tax contributions that could sustain its already underfinanced social services.

In 2010, despite the broad dissatisfaction with democracy and its benefits, democratic backsliding was not inevitable. Rather, that outcome was a result of a combination of choices by significant domestic and international actors. First, although the development of the new regime could be seen as simply a direct outcome of the competition fueled by partocracy, much of the shape it has taken was guided by Orbán's view of politics and his own role in it. Orbán defines politics as "reality without ideology", which seems to be attested in his political career which saw him move from the democratic liberal left to right-wing authoritarianism.[49] Thus, instead of ideas, Orbán believes in the maximization of power in the political, social, and economic realms. He equates politics with war: confrontation is preferred to compromise and the ends justify the means in a process by which opponents have to be defeated and eliminated as future contenders for power.[50] He believes that he naturally embodies the traditional, patriarchal values of hundreds of thousands of rural Hungarians. At the same time, he does not believe in the benefits of political pluralism and individual freedom, but in the necessity of a strong leader who can assure order.

Second, significant external actors, such as the United States and the European Union, were inefficient in countering antidemocratic developments.

Although the Obama administration continually raised concerns about the status of human rights or corruption in Hungary, it was unwilling to reprimand an ally which, unlike many other NATO allies, was a willing contributor to US military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2010.[51] More importantly, the European Union that had been a driving force behind democratic consolidation could only restrain the attempts of the Orbán government to undermine democracy. With the weakening of rule of law in Hungary,[52] Hungarians increasingly expected that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) would remedy the injustices the state committed against them. While the rulings of the ECHR meant effective defense to human rights in Hungary, generally speaking, EU institutions were not only too slow to keep up with Orbán's *blitzkrieg*, but also limited in their means. For instance, in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms to uphold democratic values laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Commission could use only infringement proceedings, informal pressure, and so far mostly empty threats of withholding funds. Ironically, EU funds that are the largest sources of systemic corruption in Hungary help to sustain the regime, while the EU's self-proclaimed status as a grouping of democratic states provides the current Hungarian regime with a cover of democratic legitimacy. In other words, by its behavior, the EU simultaneously constrains, sustains, and legitimizes the Orbán regime. The result is a special type of hybrid regime that can be best described as an externally sustained one.[53]

CONCLUSION

Since 1989, Hungary showed two contradictory faces: between 1990 and 2010 it was a liberal democracy, whilst it became a hybrid regime after 2010. Hungary started out with high hopes in 1989 and built and maintained a functioning

democratic system in the twenty years that followed. It completed the process of democratic transition and implemented a sophisticated set of institutions that respected the rule of law. Pro-market regulations and high foreign direct investment contributed to fast economic development from 1995 onwards. Hungary joined NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004). Up until 2006, Hungary appeared to be one of the few success stories of the post-communist democratization and democratic consolidation. However, formal political stability had its social costs, making an increasing number of people in the rural areas feel marginalized. These costs came to haunt and destabilize democracy between 2006 and 2010. As a consequence, Hungarian democracy has suffered a setback since 2010. In the last decade, democratic rights and freedoms have been withering away, democratic institutions have been hollowed out as governing practices have taken an autocratic turn.

What democratic backsliding means for Hungary's membership in the European Union and for the future of democracy in Hungary is not yet entirely clear. As for the former, there exists no prior example of reverse transition within the European Union. Hungary is the first EU-member that has taken a non-democratic turn, though Poland has followed in Hungary's tracks. Because of this lack of precedence, it remains to be seen whether it is possible for a semi-authoritarian regime to be a fully-fledged member of the European Union in the long run. As for the future of democracy, it is still uncertain whether the current hybrid regime is the end product of this backsliding or whether the system is likely to further deteriorate into an unequivocally authoritarian regime. The re-election of Fidesz in 2018 has left such an outcome possible, arguably, even likely. It is high time for Hungarian citizens, who had not identified strongly with the post-1989 democratic system, to

decide whether they will come to value democracy retrospectively as many of them did come to feel nostalgic about the Communist Kádár regime in the 1990s. It will be also important to see if the citizenry would be willing to actively engage in politics, beyond occasional protest demonstrations, and work for the re-emergence of democracy.

All in all, it is difficult to tell what the future might hold for the Hungarian political system. A pessimistic reading of Hungarian history certainly suggests a bleak future for democracy in Hungary. According to this view, democratic traditions had few roots in Hungary. Thus, it is not democratic backsliding that represents an exception to the rule, but the twenty years of democracy that existed after 1989. What we have been witnessing since 2010 is simply the re-emergence of long-term historical patterns of authoritarianism.[54] Admittedly, the reestablishment of democracy in Hungary would be difficult, especially considering the extent to which the Orbán regime has cemented itself in power through legal and semi-legal means and in light of the inability of opposition forces to unite for the greater good as they did in 1989. However, just as the emergence of democracy and democratic backsliding were not inevitable in Hungary, neither is the survival of existing authoritarian tendencies.

It is true that the current authoritarian leadership may appear to have consolidated its power. Nevertheless, an important lesson that can be drawn from the fate of democracy in Hungary is that a regime or a political system may appear stronger than it really is. This suggests that there exists a chance for the re-emergence of democracy. Whether it will happen depends to a considerable extent on the choices and actions of political actors inside and outside the parliament. Regardless of what direction Hungarian politics will take in the future, another lesson

that its post-1989 history offers is that democracy cannot be narrowly defined purely in terms of institutions.[55] Institutions can be easily hollowed out by leaders who do not respect freedom and other democratic values. Democracy can only be preserved if both the political elite and the electorate are committed to live and act by its values.

Abbreviations and names: Political parties, organizations and their year of foundation

Együtt	Together	(2012)
Fidesz, *Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége,*	Federation of Young Democrats	(1988)
FKGP, *Független Kisgazdapárt,*	Independent Smallholders Party	(1988 [1930])
Jobbik, *Jobbik Magyarországért,*	Movement for a Better Hungary	(2002)
KDNP, *Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt,*	Christian Democratic People's Party	(1989[1945]
LMP, *Lehet Más a Politika*	Politics Can Be Different	(2009)
MDF, Magyar Demokrata Fórum	Hungarian Democratic Forum	(1987)
MIÉP, *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja,*	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	(1993)
Momentum	Momentum	(2017)
MSZDP, *Magyar Szociáldemokrata Párt,*	Hungarian Social Democratic Party	(1989 [1890])
MSZP, *Magyar Szocialista Párt,*	Hungarian Socialist Party	(1989)
Munkáspárt	Worker's Party	(1989)
Párbeszéd	Dialogue	(2013)
SZDSZ, *Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége,*	Alliance of Free Democrats	(1988)

Table 10.1. The major characteristics of the electoral system before 2012 and after 2012.

	1990-2010	**2014-**
General features		
Type	Mixed	Mixed
Election rounds	2	1
Turnout requirement for valid results in first round	50%	-
Turnout requirement for valid results in first round	25%	-
Total Number of MPs elected	386	199
Single member districts		
MPs elected in single member districts	176	106
Turnout requirements	50% in first round	-
Electoral rules	Majority MP getting more than 50% of the vote elected; or The first three candidates plus any candidate over 15% of the vote proceeds to round two where candidate with the most votes is elected;	Plurality Candidate with the most votes elected;
Proportional representation		
MPs elected on regional party lists	152	-
MPs elected on national party (i.e. compensation) lists	58	93
Electoral threshold for party lists	4% in 1990; 5% in 1994-2010 for single party lists	5% for single party lists 10% for joint lists of two

	10% for joint lists of two parties 15% for joint lists of three or more parties	parties 15% for joint lists of three or more parties
Votes counted at the distribution of compensation seats	the sum of votes cast for losing candidates of each party in the first valid round; plus the sum of votes remaining in the regional lists after the distribution of the seats of each single-seat constituency	The sum of votes cast losing candidates of each party in the first valid round; plus the surplus votes of the winning candidate over the candidate with the second most votes

Table 10.2. Hungarian political parties and their ideological positions (1990-2010)

Far Left	*Socialist*	*Liberal*	*Conservative*	*Far Right*
Worker's Party	MSZP	SZDSZ	Fidesz	MIÉP
	MSZDP		MDF	Jobbik
			FKGP	
			KDNP	

Table 10.3. Hungarian political parties and their ideological positions (after 2010)

Far left	*Socialist*	*Green*	*Liberal*	*Nationalist-Populist*	*Far Right*
	MSZP	LMP	Együtt	before 2015: Fidesz	Jobbik
		Párbeszéd	Momentum	after 2015: Jobbik	Fidesz

Figure 10.1. Changes in the Freedom in the World index in Central and Eastern Europe (2006-2018)



Source: https://freedomhouse.org/

Timeline showing major events

1989	The formation of the Opposition Roundtable, National Roundtable talks between the Communist Party and the Opposition Roundtable, in October, proclamation of the third Hungarian Republic, democratic constitution accepted and unsolved issues resolved through referendum in November.
1990	The first free elections: the center-right MDF's election victory. Coalition government (MDF-FKGP-KDNP). Taxi-drivers' blockade as an anti-government protest.
1994	The return to power of the Communist successor party (MSZP). Coalition government (MSZP-SZDSZ).
1995	Introduction of the economic austerity package
1998	Election victory of center-right Fidesz. Coalition government (Fidesz-FKGP-MDF).
1999	NATO membership.
2002	Election victory of center-left MSZP. Coalition government (MSZP-SZDSZ).
2004	EU membership.
2006	The governing party (MSZP) re-elected for the first time.

	Coalition government (MSZP-SZDSZ). In the autumn, violent clashes on the streets between anti-government protesters and the police.
2008-10	First minority government (MSZP).
2010	Election victory of Fidesz-KDNP leads to its super-majority in the parliament. The era of the System of National Cooperation (NER) declared.
2011	New constitution (Fundamental Law) passed by the votes of pro-government MPs only.
2012-3	Checks and balances deconstructed, electoral law changed in favor of the governing party.
2014	Free but unfair elections, Fidesz re-elected, 'illiberal state' declared.
2016	Pro-government paramilitary forces prevent a referendum initiated by the opposition. Government-initiated referendum on migration quotas turns to be invalid.
2016-7	Vehement anti-immigrant campaign against Islamic migrants (and against George Soros and the European Union for their allegedly soft migration policy)
2017	Repeated government attacks on independent NGOs
2018	Government attack on the migration policy of the United Nations. Non-free elections resulted in the third consecutive electoral victory of Fidesz.

Fact sheet

Area	93,030 km^2
Population (2011)	9,937,628[56]
Major cities (2016)[57]	
Budapest:	1 759 407
Debrecen	203 059
Szeged	162 621
Miskolc	158,101
Below the poverty line (2014)	15.9%[58]
Unemployment rate (2016)	5.1%[59]
GDP per capita (2016):	$26,689[60]
Higher education (2011)	19%[61]
Literacy rate (2015)	99.4%[62]

The five largest ethnic and national minorities in Hungary

		Minority membership	Percentage of Total Population
1.	Roma	315,583	3.18%
2.	German	185,696	1.87%
3.	Romanian	35,641	0.36%
4.	Slovak	35,208	0.35%

5.	Croatian	26,774	0.27%

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, "Population Census 2011," http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/. Access: 10 November 2017.

Parties in the Hungarian Parliament[63]

Party	Deputies
Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union – Christian Democratic People's Party (Fidesz-KDNP)	133
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	26
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	20
Democratic Coalition (DK)	9
Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	8
Together (Együtt)	1
The National Self-Government of Germans Living in Hungary	1
Independent	1

Prime Ministers and Their Cabinets

1990-3	József Antall	(MDF-FKGP-KDNP)
1993-4	Péter Boross	(MDF-KDNP)
1994-8	Gyula Horn	(MSZP-SZDSZ)
1998-2002	Viktor Orbán	(Fidesz-FKGP-MDF)
2002-4	Péter Medgyessy	(MSZP-SZDSZ)
2004-9	Ferenc Gyurcsány	(MSZP-SZDSZ; 2008-9: MSZP minority government)
2009-2010	Gordon Bajnai	(MSZP)
2010-	Viktor Orbán	(Fidesz/KDNP)

Presidents (Elected by Parliament)

1990-2000	Árpád Göncz
2000-5	Ferenc Mádl
2005-10	László Sólyom
2010-12	Pál Schmitt
2012-	János Áder

Short biographical portraits of two political figures

Árpád Göncz (1922-2015) was the first President of the democratic Hungarian Republic. He served two terms as President between 1990 and 2000. While his activist approach to the office during his first term generated some controversies and Supreme Court decisions, it also helped to clarify constitutional ambiguities about the division of competencies between various government institutions of the new

democratic regime. He was active in politics, taking advantage of his most powerful constitutional tool, the right to speak out on political questions in the media or parliament efficiently.

In 1990, Árpád Göncz was elected with the support of Conservative and Liberal fractions in the Parliament, while in 1995 he was re-elected with the support of Socialist and Liberal fractions. In his second term, he became much less active in shaping internal politics and focused on fulfilling mostly his ceremonial duties. His popularity as a politician remained high throughout and beyond his terms and his conduct in office won general respect and popularity for the presidency as well.

Due to his activity in the 1956 revolution, Árpád Göncz spent five years in prison in 1958-63. In the 1980s, he was known as an author and literary translator of the works of numerous British and American authors. In 1988-90, he served as Chairman of the Hungarian Pen Club. In 1988, he was a founding member of the Alliance of Free Democrats.

Viktor Orbán (1963-) served as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002 and has served in that office again since 2010. He was one of the founders of Fidesz, which originally started as an anti-regime youth organization in 1988 and later became a left-liberal party that entered parliament in 1990. Orbán rose to public recognition in 1989 after giving an address at the reburial of Imre Nagy and other martyrs of the 1956 revolution, openly demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Between 1993 and 1995, his party moved to the center-right, and established close relationship with religious denominations. Orbán was first elected Prime Minister in 1998 as the leader of a center-right coalition government, consisting of his party Fidesz, the Smallholder's Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Although he lost the subsequent elections in 2002 and 2006 to the Socialist Party, he managed to retain his position as the president of Fidesz and rebuilt his party while in opposition. As part of this process, Orbán expanded his control over his party after 2003, making sure that no party candidate could run in the elections without his consent.

In 2010, he returned to power as the charismatic leader of the Fidesz-KDNP party alliance that received two-third majority of seats in the Parliament and was re-elected twice—in 2014 and 2018. His "system of national cooperation" provided the foundation for Orbán's restructuring of the political system, creating what he calls an "illiberal democracy." He changed the constitution, put an end to the system of checks and balances, rewrote electoral laws to Fidesz's advantage, asserted strong control over not only the party but also the state bureaucracy and most of the media, and restricted the political rights of the citizens. His rule is personalist and authoritarian. He has increasingly used an ethno-nationalist discourse and, as a consequence, has moved away from the political center to represent a right-radical position. The end result has been the systematic deconstruction of liberal democracy and the birth of an autocratic hybrid regime between democracy and dictatorship.

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[41] Kristóf Szombati, *The Revolt of the Provinces: Anti-Gypsyism and Right-Wing Politics in Hungary* (New York - Oxford: Berghahn, 2018).
[42] Initially citizens did save on these measures. However, the state-owned gas providers also benefited, because the decrease in the price of gas was smaller than the drop in the market price. Péter Magyari, "Már a nagy választási rezsicsökkentéskor is olcsóbb volt a gáz, mint amennyiért a lakosság kapta [Gas prices were already lower than WHAT citizens paid as a result of the election time utility bill cuts]," *!!444!!!* (14 February 2018), at https://444.hu/2018/02/14/mar-a-nagy-valasztasi-rezsicsokkenteskor-is-olcsobb-volt-a-gaz-mint-amennyiert-a-lakossag-kapta. Access: 12 March 2018.
[43] By victimizing Hungary, the Orbán cabinet disregarded the fact that Hungary had been an ally of Nazi Germany in World War Two, and Hungarian authorities had helped Adolf Eichmann and his squad to transport most Hungarian Jews to extermination camps.
[44] For instance, Orbán often refers to "Turul", a mythical bird, which is supposed to symbolize the common ethnic roots of Hungarians. "Turul" replaces the reference to the "republic" in his speeches. Turul also refers to "genetically" coded belonging to an ethnic community, while the modern concept of "republic" would refer to the nation as political community. By referring to the first one, Orbán revives the pagan traditions which even contradict to the Christian traditions of Hungary declared in the basic law. See András Bozóki, "Családi tűzfészek: a kultúra a szimbolikus politika fogságában [Family Nest: Culture in Symbolic Political Captivity]," in Bálint Magyar and Júlia Vásárhelyi (eds.), *Magyar polip: A posztkommunista maffiaállam* [Hungarian polyp: The post-communist mafia state] (Budapest: Noran Libro, 2013), pp. 346-367.
[45] For an elaborated analysis of Orbán's rhetoric on work, home, order, and family, see Umut Korkut, *Liberalization Challenges in Hungary: Elitism, Progressivism, and Populism* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 168-177.
[46] "London calling: why home-loving Hungarians are flocking to British capital", *euronews* (27 February 2015), at http://www.euronews.com/2015/02/27/london-calling-why-home-loving-hungarians-are-flocking-to-british-capital. Accessed on 12 March 2018.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Károly Beke, "Ide vezetett a tömeges kivándorlás: több magyar lépett le, mint gondoltuk [The Consequences of emigration: more Hungarians left than previously thought]," *portfolio.hu* (30 August 2017), at https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/ide-vezetett-a-tomeges-kivandorlas-tobb-magyar-lepett-le-mint-gondoltuk.260665.html. Accessed on 20 January 2018; József Hornyák, "Megdöbbentő számok: soha nem hagyták még el ennyien Magyarországot [Shocking numbers: never have so many Hungarians left]," *Világgazdaság* (5 April 2016), at https://www.vg.hu/kozelet/tarsadalom/megdobbento-szamok-soha-nem-hagytak-meg-el-ennyien-magyarorszagot-468099/. Accessed on20 January 2018.
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[53] András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs, "An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime" [note 33].
[54] Rudolf Ungváry, *A láthatatlan valóság: A fasisztoid mutáció a mai Magyarországon* [Invisible reality: fascistic transmutation in contemporary Hungary] (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2014).
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